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Infringement and Remedies Provisions
of the New Copyright Law*
By PAUL W. VAPNEK
Adjunct Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law; Member, California
Bar; JD., University of San Francisco, 1964.
This afternoon I will cover the Infringement and Remedies provi-
sions of the new Copyright Law.' All of you have received an outline
which sets out the basics of the new law and some things to look out
for. I will review those and, depending on how long that takes,
perhaps go into some very basic material on infringement litigation
which will be much too elementary for those of you who are in
practice.
First, I want to call your attention to House Report 94-14761
and specifically pages 158 to 164 of the report, which discuss the
Infringement and Remedies provisions of the law, and give a very
good, brief analysis of what Congress intended. I will also admit to
you, as I have done before in class, that as many times as I have
read section 101 of the 1909 Statute,' I have never fully understood
it. I don't know if I am alone; but most practitioners won't admit
that they don't understand the statute. It is probably one of the
most obscure pieces of legislation that has been written, although I
must say I'm not familiar with the SEC Act and the Internal Reve-
nue Code. My practice involves a substantial amount of patent
work, and I can say that section 101, on damages is more obscure
than any patent section I know. In any event, sections 501 through
510 of the new statute are considerably more straightforward, sim-
pler, and more easily understood than the equivalent provisions of
the old Act. If nothing else had been done in the new Act, this alone
would have been a tremendous advance.
* Edited transcripton of a speech given at a Copyright Symposium sponsored by
COMM/ENT and Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts held at San Francisco, California on Sep-
tember 17 - 18, 1977.
1. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq. (1976)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
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The outline that I prepared discusses first the prerequisites for
any suit for infringement. Certain provisions of the new law are
extremely important, both to those who will enter copyright practice
and those of you who are already in practice. Other provisions pro-
vide no substantial change from the old practice. For example, reg-
istration of a claim to copyright is a prerequisite to suit both under
the new law' and the present 1909 law,' but one major change, of
course, with preemption of common law copyright, is the require-
ment of registration of a claim to copyright in unpublished works
under the new law.' You have already heard about the difference
between common law copyright as it has been known and as it will
continue under the new law, and published' works. Both published
and unpublished works, that is, works protected by what has been
known as common law copyright will require registration under the
new law before a suit can be brought.' Further, and perhaps most
important, unless the work is registered, no attorney fees, nor the
alternative of obtaining statutory damages will be available., That's
a very, very important aspect under section 412 of the new Act.
Unless the unpublished work is registered prior to the commence-
ment of the infringement, no attorney fees and no statutory dam-
ages are available.o For published works the registration must be
made within three months of publication."
Under the new law, statutory damages are an alternative remedy
chosen solely at the instance of the plaintiff." Under the 1909 Act,
there was the "in lieu" provision, 3 and it was rather obscure as to
who would have the ability to select "in lieu" damages. But it is
crystal clear under the new law that the plaintiff has the election
to choose statutory damages, which can be between $250 and
$10,000, at any time prior to judgment." The plaintiff can now
4. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1976).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1976).
7. "Publication" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) as:
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution,
public performance, or public display, constitutes publication . . .
8. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1976).
9. Id. at § 412.
10. Id. at § 412(1).
11. Id. at § 412(2).
12. Id. at § 504(c)(1).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1976).
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choose to see how the case is going, to determine if he or his lawyer
have proven damages to the satisfaction of the judge or jury. If not,
then he may at any time prior to judgment, make an election to
accept the statutory damages as set out in the new law. This is a
major change from prior law and of course the amount may be
between $250 and $10,000, a substantial increase over the amount
of the "in lieu" damage provision of the old law.
I will stress again the importance of registration. Of course, no one
now knows how practice is going to develop under the new law. It is
sheer guesswork for all of us. The Copyright Office regulations have
not been promulgated. Nobody really knows exactly how things are
going to go, but it is my feeling, based upon my own reading of the
law, that I will recommend to my clients that they register unpub-
lished works. For example, I will recommend to book publishers that
they register manuscripts, and when authors come in who are going
to submit manuscripts to publishers I will also suggest registration.
Authors are typically like inventors - paranoid, perhaps with
some reason. There is the old joke about a man who is paranoid but
it turns out that there really are people after him. Most authors and
inventors are convinced that they are going to have their concepts
and ideas, stolen. That does happen occasionally, but typically it
is a rarity. Nevertheless, authors are concerned about that happen-
ing, and usually want to protect themselves by copyrighting their
work before they submit it to publishers. This is simply not done
now. Publishers are supposed to be trusted and one sends the manu-
script off and hopes for the best. Authors have typically had a very
difficult time understanding that the work of their creativity is
theirs, that a publisher has no right to acquire and publish it with-
out contracting for so doing, and that the author in fact has rights
to enforce against a publisher. Somehow or other a copyright notice
on the manuscript makes authors feel better. Of course, under pres-
ent law and under the new law, no such notice is required." Under
the new law, unpublished works clearly will not require a notice."
But with registration possible under the new law and the term of
copyright not being affected by the registration, I will recommend
registration of manuscripts. At yesterday's session a form of regis-
tration by the Writer's Guild was mentioned. The Copyright Office
will likely do that same thing; there will be a nice certificate with a
big red seal, no doubt, that will make authors feel much better.
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976).
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Now, lawyers are not supposed to be psychiatrists or psychologists
although we regularly do similar work as those of you who are in
practice know. This is going to be a psychological palliative for those
authors who are concerned about having their works taken. I may
yet change my mind, but for the present, I'm going to recommend
registration for their unpublished work to my clients. This is going
to apply to both authors and to publishers, that is, when the pub-
lishers acquire rights by means of a publication agreement, that
they then promptly register the work and worry about any conse-
quences. There won't be any consequences that I foresee but then
the extra step of registration of the work again when it is published
will be required.
The outline mentions the requirement of recordation of transfer
under section 205(d)" prior to the bringing of suit. One of the basics
in a suit for infringement is the right to bring the suit. That is
sometimes not raised other than as a technical defense. You must
normally allege ownership, and of course, the answer will deny own-
ership, if that is an issue. The recordation of transfer is required
before bringing a suit, so it is conceivable that you could get your
suit filed, bring the defendant in, and then have the suit dismissed
for failure to record the transfer prior to the filing of the action. I
mention parenthetically, in the outline, the necessity of a transfer
of causes of action for past infringement. I have seen assignments
which do not include such language and which have led to problems.
Normally, in assignments of patents or of trademarks, there is a
standard phraseology transfering all rights, including all rights for
past causes of action. I have seen copyright assignments that for
reasons best known to the parties to the assignment have not in-
cluded such language. I have mentioned this in the outline simply
as a reminder; under the new law this will be especially important
because of the ability to separately transfer exclusive rights - the
divisibility of copyright" which has been mentioned already. It is
important, then, to obtain prior rights in the event that something
occurred in the past which might require proof of ownership prior
to the time that the owner bringing the suit acquired those rights.
What constitues infringement? Under the 1909 Act, there was no
definition of infringement. Curiously, infringement was listed, but
was never defined;" it took case law to define exactly what consti-
17. Id. at § 205(d).
18. Id. at § 201(d).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
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tuted infringement. Infringement is now defined as a violation of
any of the rights outlined in sections 106 to 118.20 The prior limita-
tion of a public performance for profit is no longer in the law as of
January 1,21 so that nonprofit organizations will no longer be able
to enjoy an exemption. Of course, there were questions raised in the
cases about what was or what was not a performance for profit. One
of the cases that we study in the Intellectual Property Law course
involves an orchestra playing in a restaurant.2 2 Oliver Wendell
Holmes said that this is for profit, for, why would the owner of the
restaurant have the performers playing music if not to have people
come and eat, paying money for it; therefore its purpose was for
profit. But that distinction will no longer be applicable and any
public performance of music and other works will be an infringe-
ment with only very limited exceptions provided for in section 110.23
It has already been mentioned that the importation of copies and
phonorecords in violation of section 602 has been tightened up in the
new law. That is another important aspect of the new law because
there was a loophole in the old law with respect to importation. The
problems of importation - violation of the manufacturing clause -
are perhaps beyond the scope of what I want to talk about. This
fascinating area of the law will be phased out. The importation of
works manufactured overseas has been an on-going problem. As an
aside, a little historical note, when you hear talk about book pirates
and record pirates, and so on, you might realize that many of the
people talking about piracy and especially piracy occurring in Tai-
wan and Hong Kong and other places are unaware of the fact that
the United States in the late 1800's was the worst place for piracy.
The printers in the United States were the worst pirates of English
language. books, and the manufacturing clause was introduced by
the Chace Act in 18915 as a quid pro quo for the stopping of piracy
by American printers. So the manufacturing clause inserted in 1891
as an amendment to the 1870 Act" in order to stop America from
pirating English language works has been with us ever since. It
became a curious anomaly in the copyright law because it was pro-
tectionist and not a copyright matter. It was a kind of tariff provi-
20. 17 U.S.C. H§ 106-118 (1976).
21. Id. at § 106(4). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
22. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1976).
24. Id. at § 602.
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
26. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
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sion or a union and industry protection provision and any change,
any attempt to remove it was fought tooth and nail by a combina-
tion of the printers and typographers' unions, the binders' unions
and industry representatives. They very nearly won the battle to
keep the manufacturing clause in the new law; the provision for a
phase out in 19827 was a compromise that was introduced to break
the deadlock. Look out because there is a further provision that the
Register must make a report to Congress prior to the phase out date
as to whether or not the printing industry has been injured by the
phase out of the manufacturing clause." I foresee yet another fight
to reintroduce the manufacturing clause somewhere in 1981 or 1982.
That's really an aside, one of those fascinating footnotes in copy-
right law which makes it so interesting and so challenging.
I have listed in the outline limitations on copyright rights which
affect the right of the owner of an exclusive right to bring an action.
We could spend the entire hour talking about "fair use." That has
been discussed several times here, and I will not go into it other than
add my own two cents worth by saying that the "fair use" provisions
of section 107" codify what has been the case law. Well, I suppose
that that is true, but having read the Williams & Wilkins case,'" the
trial judge's opinion and the Court of Claims opinion, I don't have
any great optimism that the decisions will be uniform after January
1, 1978 on what is or is not fair use despite the presence of the
statutory guidelines. They are so nebulous and are so open to inter-
pretation and misinterpretation, and those of you who have read
some of the old copyright cases know how badly judges interpret
statutory language, even fairly clear statutory language, that the
problems of fair use is going to be with us for a long time.
The other limitations are listed, again in very general terms in
the outline. I won't go into them other than to. mention that they
are listed and they will be problem areas and areas of potential
defense if you are representing a copyright owner.
I want to mention something not listed in the outline that you
should make a note of, the provision in section 410(c)" that registra-
tion of a claim to copyright within five years of publication will
27. 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1976).
28. 122 CONG. REC. S17252-53 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
30. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) aff'd per curiam
420 U.S. 376 (1975).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976).
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result in the certificate constituting prima facie evidence of validity
of the copyright. That is a major change in the law, and I suggest
that you compare it to section 209 of the 1909 Act,32 in which the
Certificate of Registration is simply prima facie evidence of the facts
stated in the Certificate. Registration within five years of publica-
tion will result in the certificate being prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright. I am not certain what that is going to do
in litigation, but at least it will shift the burden, at the minimum
it will shift the burden to the defendant to disprove validity. You
will have a prima facie case not only of the facts stated in the
certificate, but also of the validity of copyright; as long as you can
get the registration through the Copyright Office within five years
of publication, you will have a prima facie valid copyright, not
directly subject to attack, but only subject to the burden shifting
to the defendant to disprove validity. Now, it remains to be seen
what burden is going to be shifted to the defendant and what exactly
the Judge will require the defendant to show to disprove validity.
But nevertheless, it will make the defendant's job that much more
difficult in litigation. Again, I suggest that prompt registration
ought to be routine. Of course, this applies only to published works,
but in any event, I think it is wise to register works routinely as soon
after publication as is possible.
Who may sue? The legal and beneficial owner of any right may
bring suit. The judge-made concept of indivisibility of copyright will
no longer be in effect. That is one of those judge-made rules to which
I referred earlier, like the rule which looked for the strictest applica-
tion of the provisions of the notice section of the copyright act. If
the notice were not quite right, or not quite in the proper location,
it resulted in the loss of copyright rights. The indivisibility of copy-
right concept typically did the same thing, especially in certain
cases of contributions to periodicals or compendiums and the like.
That concept will no longer be with us and its demise is long over-
due. It will no longer be necessary to have the entire bundle of
copyright rights in one owner to bring the suit.33 Question: What
happens if the owner of one right brings suit? Of course, the law now
makes provision for either mandatory or discretionary joinder of the
owners of the other rights." A question was asked of me yesterday:
"Well, what about a non-exclusive licensee under one of the exclu-
32. 17 U.S.C. § 209 (1970).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976).
34. Id.
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sive rights, could that non-exclusive licensee bring suit in his or her
own name for violation of that right?" I would think the answer is
"No," that it would be necessary to join the owner of the exclusive
right, or if there were an exclusive license with residual rights in the
title holder, perhaps to bring the title holder into the action in much
the same way as the legal owner of a patent is joined either as a
voluntary or involuntary plaintiff or involuntary defendant when
the exclusive licensee brings suit. There are going to be some inter-
esting procedural wrangles in connection with bringing in extra par-
ties, but nevertheless, it is quite clear from the statute that the legal
and beneficial owner of any exclusive right can bring suit in his or
her own name for violation of that specific right." There is an inter-
esting provision in section 501(c)" and noted in the outline as to the
TV licensee for a local service area being able to bring a suit when
a cable system is the infringer. You might keep that section in mind
for those instances in which you might be doing work for a licensee
such as that.
Now, the remedies under the new law: For reasons best known to
the draftsmen, they use the terminology "temporary injunction.",
In the outline I put that phrase in quotes. The statute uses the
phrase "temporary injunction." The Federal Rules" and the usual
terminology refer to three kinds of injunctions: a temporary re-
straining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunc-
tion. The draftsmen called it a temporary injunction which of course
is an unfortunate use of language of the kind you usually see in
newspapers. You should not see this in legal draftsmanship. In any
event, temporary and final injunctions are available under the new
Act." The injunction remedies are made subject to the provisions
of section 1498 of Title 28 of the United States Code which provides
for reasonable and entire compensation for violation of copyright
rights against the United States.'" Any such case must be brought
in the Court of Claims where no injunctions are available against
the government." That provision for copyright suits against the
United States in the Court of Claims is a fairly new provision added
to section 1498. That was the provision which led to the William &
35. Id.
36. Id. at § 501(c).
37. Id. at § 502(a).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1976).
40. Id.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1973).
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Wilkins case" which those of you who are interested in the problem
of fair use really ought to read including the opinion of one of the
dissenting judges in .the Court of Claims, who called the majority
decision the Dred Scott decision of copyright law."
The new statute spells out the jurisdiction of the courts with
respect to injunctions and contempts."1 It really does nothing more
than reiterate the basic power of the courts in cases in which the
courts are empowered to grant injunctions and to hold people in
contempt. I am not really certain why they decided to add that
because the Federal Rules provide for it" in any event, but neverthe-
less, section 502" spells out the power of the court in detail.
Section 50311 which provides for impoundment and disposition of
infringing articles, is basically a restatement of provisions of the
1909 Act. One of my partners has written a memo in the office in
which he calls the provisions for attachment and impoundment of
infringing articles one of the most powerful tools of a copyright
lawyer and one of the least known and least used. He has used those
provisions very effectively in recent years to attach substantial
quantities of infringing goods being imported from Korea and Tai-
wan. It is an extraordinarily powerful tool. One of these days a
defendant with some extra money is going to challenge an attach-
ment and impoundment and will probably win on the basis of the
problem that was solved, I thought, with respect to prejudgment
attachments in the Sniadach case" in the Supreme Court. That case
involved the problem of prejudgment garnishment of wages but I
think the analogous problem will finally wend its way to the Su-
preme Court which will hold against attachment in copyright cases.
In the meantime, it is an available remedy which you ought to keep
in mind. You can seize allegedly infringing goods and by putting up
a bond which could be relatively small, literally take away the de-
fendant's goods and force a favorable compromise in the litigation.
It is a tremendously powerful tool which is only rarely used.
Section 503 provides that after judgment, the court has the power
to order destruction of the infringing articles," another powerful tool
42. See note 30, supra.
43. Note 30, supra at 1387 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1976).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 65, 70.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1976).
47. Id. at § 503.
48. Snaidach v. Family Finance Co., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1976).
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for the plaintiffs attorney to force a compromise on the defendant.
The defendant's lawyer will try to figure out a way to save these
goods for the future, rather than permitting them to be destroyed.
The damages and profits provision of the new Act, section 504,1o
clarifies and simplifies the law in an extraordinary way. The infrin-
ger now is liable for either actual damages and additional profits or
statutory damages," and the plaintiff has that election, as I men-
tioned earlier, at any time prior to final judgment." Statutory dam-
ages cover all infringements involved in the action." There have
been some questions in the cases as to exactly what is covered by
the statutory language on infringement. Can you collect for every
copy? What if there were several editions of an allegedly infringing
magazine? For example, Time Magazine is published in a number
of regional editions. Is each of those regional editions a separate
infringement? Those are questions which have, in fact, been raised
in litigation. The statute now makes it clear that statutory damages
cover all infringements involved in the action as opposed to all
infringements involved in the transaction." I believe that it is not
worth spending a lot of time trying to analyze that problem, but
nevertheless, be aware now that the objective is to cover all the
infringements in which the infringer may have been involved even
if there are separate editions or separate publications of the infring-
ing work.
In a case of willful infringement, the statute has made the maxi-
mum penalty very substantial. The court has the power to assess
statutory damages up to $50,00066 in case of willful infringement,
and of course on the other side of that coin, in the case of innocent
infringement, statutory damages can be reduced to $100.00," mean-
ing that the court will not excuse the infringement, but the penalty
will not be great. Of course innocent infringers are liable for in-
fringement. I have many times been confronted by a client very
concerned about this; the client having had no knowledge of the
infringement but simply reselling an infringing article. An innocent
infringer is liable for damages, even in a situation like that of the
Green case," involving the selling of infringing records from a con-
50. Id. at § 504.
51. Id. at § 504(a).
52. Id. at § 504(c)(1).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at § 504(c)(2).
56. Id.
57. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H.L. Green, Inc., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
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cession in a five and dime store. The store was liable even though
it didn't know about the sale of the infringing recordings. Now the
court has the power to reduce the damages to $100.00. And of course
in certain instances in which fair use is raised, the court has the
power to remit damages entirely." Such a case is a kind of time
bomb, the plaintiff may think he has a very, very good case with
substantial damages, and if the court accepts the fair use defense
for a limited class of defendants the plaintiff will be entirely without
compensatory damages.
The provisions for actual damages are spelled out with clarity in
the new statute. Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages suffered,
plus the profits of the infringer, attributable to the infringement."
The present statute has been less than clear on that. The new stat-
ute is quite clear on exactly what the plaintiff is entitled to if the
plaintiff can prove them. Costs and attorney's fees are provided for
in section 505.0 Full costs are discretionary," although as a matter
of routine, full costs are awarded to the prevailing party. The court
has the power to give less than full costs now under section 505, as
well as reasonable attorney's fees." This provision is in the present
law and is continued in the new law. Attorney's fees in copyright
cases have been granted in much the same way as they have been
granted in patent cases. Where there has been what appears to the
court to be a willful and deliberate infringement, what is called in
the patent statute an exceptional case, where there seems to be bad
faith on the part of the defendant, courts will award attorney's fees.
This happened in a recent patent case" in which the plaintiff and
the plaintiffs attorney were involved in a course of conduct of fail-
ure to make discovery, of taking far out positions and of just con-
tinuing the case so that it took something like ten years to finally
get the case to judgment. The district court awarded over $200,000
in attorney's fees and the Ninth Circuit affirmed." The court said
that that was an exceptional patent case, and I suspect strongly that
the same kinds of characterizations will be made in copyright cases
for the imposition of attorney's fees. There was a case in the Fourth
58. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976).
59. Id. at § 504(a)(1).
60. Id. at § 505.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 385 F. Supp. 1 (C.D. Cal. 1973) aff'd 546 F.2d
297 (9th Cir. 1976).
64. Id.
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Circuit" not so long ago in which the trial court awarded attorney's
fees not only against the party, but also against his attorney. For-
tunately, or unfortunately, depending upon your point of view, the
Fourth Circuit reversed as to the attorney, but nevertheless, it is
something to remember for the future. Play it square in the litiga-
tion because you never know what the trial judge is going to do, and
you also never know whether the circuit court, if that happens to
you, is going to reverse the way the Fourth Circuit did.
The criminal penalties for infringement have been increased sub-
stantially, up to $10,000 and one year in jail." The record and tape
people and the movie people have some clout with Congress since
the criminal penalties for infringing sound recordings or motion
pictures are up to $25,000 or one year for the first offense, $50,000
or two years for subsequent offenses." If you are consulted by a
potential defendant in these areas, you must consider the substan-
tial penalties in the case of movies and sound recordings. There is
a recent case in the Ninth Circuit" in which the trial judge sent-
enced the defendant to six consecutive one year terms for copyright
infringement of motion pictures.
In Wise Judge Hauk suspended the sentence on condition Mr.
Wise serve one month in jail on each of the six counts. Let me
mention a couple of other areas in the criminal penalties section.
For example, there is a provision for the forfeiture and destruction
of all infringing copies and the manufacturing equipment." Then
there are provisions for fines up to $2,500 for use of a fraudulent
copyright notice or fraudulent removal of copyright notice. 0 Those
are new provisions, and another new provision has to do with false
representation in a registration application which also carries a
$2,500 fine." Those of you who prepare registration applications
should be aware of the new provisions. In our office, I have routinely
signed applications as agent for the copyright owner, but there have
been a few cases in which I have insisted that the claimant sign it.
I did not want to certify anything I was not certain of, and now with
a false representation fine of up to $2,500 I will be even more careful.
I suspect that in the future lawyers are going to insist that the
65. Kaehni v. S.S. Kresge Co., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 163 (D. Md. 1974).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1976).
67. Id.
68. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1976).
70. Id. at § 506(c).
71. Id. at § 506(e).
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copyright claimant sign all applications so that there will be no
problem of violation of that provision by any lawyer.
The statute of limitations remains the same, three years for both
civil and criminal cases.72 The seizure and forfeiture provision, sec-
tion 509,"3 is a fascinating one. The outline mentions in parentheses
that this is similar to provisions relating to narcotics and alcohol
violations. Many of you have seen cases entitled United States vs.
One 1959 Chevrolet arising from an Internal Revenue tax seizure of
a car, or a Narcotics Bureau seizure or an Internal Revenue seizure
for illegal alcohol transactions. That power is now available for vio-
lations of the copyright law." It is a separate provision so that even
if someone is acquitted on a criminal charge he may lose a car, the
printing equipment, other machinery and what not, which perhaps
may be more harmful to the defendant than a fine and the criminal
prosecution. This is a new provision of the copyright law, and I
suspect it may be -another one of those powerful tools that will be
used against the record bootleggers, the tape pirates, book pirates
and the rest.
I will mention only in passing the provisions of section 510"1 on
alterations by cable systems. There is an interesting provision in
which violation of section 510 will permit the court to deprive the
cable system of its right to a compulsory license," which is an inter-
esting penalty provision and perhaps a very serious potential pun-
ishment for violation of section 111(c)(3) of the new Act.
72. Id. at § 507.
73. Id. at § 509.
74. Id-
75. Id. at § 510.
76. Id. at § 510(b).
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